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Abstract
We study the increase in firm level risk and how it relates to the decrease in aggregate
risk [..]
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Introduction
Over the past 30 years, there has been a decline in aggregate volatility (McConnell and
Perez-Quiros (2000) and Stock and Watson (2002)). At the same time, there has been a
large increase in the volatility of firms (Campbell, Lettau, Malkiel, and Xu (2001), Comin
and Mulani (2003) and Chaney, Gabaix, and Philippon (2002)).
Our paper has two parts. First we want to explore whether the firm level trend towards
more volatility and the aggregate trend towards more stability are related, or whether the
two have moved in opposite directions by coincidence.
In the second part, we will explore the proximate reasons for the increase in firm volatil-
ity. We believe that the main suspects are:
1 The basic facts
The decline in aggregate volatility has been documented by McConnell and Perez-Quiros
(2000), Blanchard and Simon (2001) and Stock and Watson (2002).
On the other hand, firm level volatility has increased. Firm level volatility can be mea-
sured using financial data or real data. Using financial data for the US, Comin (2000)
and Campbell, Lettau, Malkiel, and Xu (2001) document an increase in volatility of idio-
syncratic stock returns using time series and cross-sectional measures of volatility. The
results in Campbell, Lettau, Malkiel, and Xu (2001) are important because they show an
increase in risk, not just an increase in predictable heterogeneity. Using accounting data,
Comin and Mulani (2003) and Chaney, Gabaix, and Philippon (2002) show an increase the
idiosyncratic volatility of employment, sales, earnings and capital expenditures.
Figure 1 shows the evolution of idiosyncratic and aggregate volatility. Aggregate
volatility (σat ) is defined as the standard deviation of the annual growth rate (γt) of real
GDP
σat =
"
1
10
+5X
τ=−4
¡
γt+τ − γ¯t
¢2# 12 (1)
where γ¯t is the average growth rate between t− 4 and t + 5. For each firm i, we compute
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the volatility of the growth rate of sales
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We then take the median across all firms present in the sample at time t as our measure of
typical firm volatility
σft = medi
©
σit
ª
Figure 1 shows the decline in σat and the increase in σ
f
t . Note also the diﬀerence of scale
between the two measures. Idiosyncratic volatility is an order of magnitude larger than
aggregate volatility.
Our first task is to show the robustness of these findings. The main issues are sample
selection bias and measurement errors. Sample selection is an issue because more small
firms have entered the COMPUSTAT database over time. Since small firms tend to be
more volatile, the changing composition could explain the trend. We deal with this first
issue by controlling for size and age, and showing that the increase in firm volatility holds
within groups of comparable firms. Comin and Mulani (2003) also show that the results
are robust to the inclusion of firms fixed eﬀects.
The second issue is whether firm level results are economically meaningful. To take
an extreme example, suppose that we live in a world of constant returns without financial
frictions or incentive problems, in which boundaries of organizations do not matter. Plants
could move among firms without any real consequences, yet firms would appear to be
volatile. Firms would simply not be the right unit of observation. One could argue that
M&As fall partly into the category or irrelevant ownership changes. Thus, as a robustness
check, we are going to show that our results are not driven by M&As.
Figure 2 shows that the trend increase in firm volatility is not driven by the entry of
young and small firms, or by an upsurge in M&A activities1. An even better way to show
that our results are economically meaningful is to show that they relate to results obtained
in other data sets. Guvenen and Philippon (2005) show that firm volatility measured
across industries in COMPUSTAT is a good predictor of both unemployment risk and wage
1This is not to say that M&As are not important. They do not matter much here because we use the
median to aggregate across firms. If we had used the mean as our benchmark for figure 1, then some large
mergers would have aﬀected our measure, and removing these mergers would have made a diﬀerence.
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inequality measured across the same industries in PSID. Comin, Groshen, and Rabin (2005)
relate firm-level volatility to wage volatility at the occupation level by taking advantage of a
unique data set that contains firm-level and worker-level information for a sample of firms in
Ohio. They document a positive relationship between firm level volatility and the volatility
and dispersion of wages at the occupation level.
If firms have really become more risky, then this should be reflected in corporate bond
spreads and corporate bond ratings. For the spread, we use Moody’s seasoned Aaa corporate
bond yield minus the 5-year treasury rate. For bond ratings, we use S&P long term domestic
issuer credit rating from COMPUSTAT, coded from 2 for AAA to 27 for D (default). We
first regress the rating on firm level characteristics (age, assets, sales, SIC code), and we
then average the residuals across firms. Figure 3 shows that Aaa spread over treasury has
increased overtime, and also that the average credit rating of firms in COMPUSTAT has
deteriorated. Both trend clearly suggest an significant increase in risk, consistent with the
increase in cash flow volatility. For more on this topic, see Campbell and Taksler (2003).
We conclude that the evidence clearly shows that U.S. firms have become more risky
over the past 30 years, and that this increase in risk in at least partly passed on to their
workers.
2 Sectoral Evidence
We have established that the aggregate stabilization of the US economy has coincided with a
large increase in firm level risk. However, in a statistical sense, this is only one observation.
Our goal in this section is to explore sectoral dynamics and see how they relate to firm
volatility. We are first going to show that the decline in aggregate volatility is accounted
for by a decrease in the co-movement of the diﬀerent sectors, and not by a decrease in the
average volatility of each sector. Second, we are going to show that sectors in which firms
have become more volatile have typically become less correlated with the aggregate.
2.1 Decomposition of Aggregate Volatility
We now perform a decomposition of the aggregate variance of the growth rate of real value
added, TFP and real value added per worker into sector variances and correlations. Let
γs,t be the growth rate of the particular variable in sector s at time t, and let ωsecst be
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the share of sales for sector s in the aggregate sales in the economy. Also, let V ([Zτ ]t+5t−4)
denote the variance of {Zt−4, Zt−3, ... Zt, ... Zt+4, Zt+5} for any generic variable Z and
Cov([Zτ ]t+5t−4, [Yτ ]t+5t−4) be the covariance between {Zt−4, Zt−3, ... Zt, ... Zt+4, Zt+5} and
{Yt−4, Yt−3, ... Yt, ... Yt+4, Yt+5}. By definition, the aggregate growth rate is
γt =
X
i
γs,tωsecs,t .
Then, using the definition of the variance,
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For simplicity, suppose that ωsecs,t = ωsecs for all the sectors i and all years t. Then, V ([γτ ]t+5t−4)
can be written as follows:
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Hence, the variance of the growth rate of aggregate sales is decomposed into two terms -
the first is related to the sector level variance of sales (variance component) and the second
reflects the covariances between the growth rates of sales at diﬀerent sectors (covariance
component).2
The covariance component is aﬀected by the sectoral variance and by the correlation
of a sector with the others. To increase further our understanding we also compute the
2The small discrepancy between the total variance and the sum of these two components is due to the
time variation of the shares.
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correlation component. Specifically, we define first the correlation of each sector with the
other sectors:
Corrsecs,t =
X
j 6=s
ωsecjP
h 6=s ωsech
Corr([γs,τ ]t+5t−4, [γj,τ ]t+5t−4) , (3)
Then we define aggregate correlation as a weighted average of the sectoral correlations:
Corrat =
X
s
ωsecs Corrsecs,t .
Figure 4 shows the decline in aggregate correlation for value added, TFP and value added
per worker. Sectoral variances display an hump-shaped pattern over time, with no obvious
decline over our sample period, 1959 to 1996. On the other hand, there is a clear decline in
correlations over time, for all three variables of interest.
Hence, we conclude that, in order to understand the decline in aggregate volatility, we
should try to understand what drives this decline in the correlation between sectors.
2.2 Firm Volatility and Sector Co-movements
We now ask if the decline in co-movement across sectors is linked to the increase in volatility
within each sector. We start from our measure of idiosyncratic firm volatility σit defined
in equation (2). We aggregate this measure within each sector to obtain a sector specific
measure of firm volatility
σsecs,t =
X
i∈s
ωitσit
where we use the share of sales of firm i in the sector as our weight
ωit =
SalesitX
j∈s
Salesjt
On the other hand, we have the sector specific correlation measure, Corrsecs,t , defined in
equation (3). We run the following regressions
Corrsecs,t − Corrsecs,t−10 = α+ β
¡
σsecs,t − σsecs,t−10
¢
+ εs,t
Table 2 shows the results when the dependent variable is the change in the correlation
of value added, employment, labor productivity and TFP. We estimate a negative β in all
specifications, and it is significant for the last three. Figure 5 shows the change in the
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correlation of output per worker between 1975 and 1990 against the change in the volatility
of firms, across the 34 sectors in our sample. In various robustness checks, we have found
that the results for productivity (either value added per worker, or TFP) are robust, while
the results for quantities (either employment or value added) are not always significant.
3 International Evidence
Should we be surprised to see an increase in firm riskiness over time? Looking around the
world, the answer is: probably not. Morck, Yeung, and Yu (2000), Durnev, Morck, and
Yeung (2004) and Li, Morck, Yang, and Yeung (2004) show that developing countries are
characterized by large aggregate and low idiosyncratic volatility, while developed countries
display the opposite pattern. If we extrapolate from the cross-section to the time series,
we would expect to see a decline in aggregate volatility and an increase in firm level risk as
countries grow. In this sense, the U.S. experience may not be surprising.
Some research has been done on non-US data. Frazzini and Marsh (2002) do not find
the same increase in the UK. Thesmar and Thoenig (2004) show an increase in France,
especially for listed firms.
4 Theoretical Discussion
We are now going to discuss a few possible explanations for the facts that we have uncovered
so far. In the last part of the paper, we will try to test these explanations
The first potential explanation is that aggregate stabilization led to more risk taking by
firms. The cause of the aggregate stabilization could be luck, or better monetary policy.
The link with individual risk taking could be the following. Suppose that reallocation is
ineﬃciently low in recessions. Then entrepreneurs may be reluctant to start risky ventures
because of the eventuality that they fail at a time where the economy is in a bust. This
applies equally to human capital (unemployment risk) or physical capital (fire sales). A
decline in aggregate volatility can therefore lead to more individual risk taking.
Other explanations assume that there is a change at the firm level that drives the increase
in firm volatility and leads, directly or indirectly, to a decrease in aggregate volatility.
The second and third explanations start from an increase in competition in the goods
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market. In both cases, it is easy to see how competition can drive up firm level risk (Comin
and Mullani (2005) document a threefold increase in the turnover of market shares during
the postwar period). The explanations diﬀer in how they link competition to aggregate
volatility. The second explanation, formalized in Philippon (2003) is that more competition
leads firms to adjust their prices faster, which reduces the impact of aggregate demand
shocks. While intuitively appealing, the simple sticky price explanation cannot be complete
because it also implies more volatile prices, contrary to the evidence.3
The third explanation, formalized in Comin and Mullani (2005), is that more compe-
tition leads to a decline in the variance of aggregate TFP shocks. To see why this could
be the case, assume that each firm can choose to invest in the development of two kinds
of innovations. Idiosyncratic, embodied innovations are patentable and benefit mostly the
innovator. GPT-style innovations can potentially aﬀect all the firms in the economy. With
a large number of firms, if all the research eﬀort is devoted to embodied innovations, we
would expect smooth aggregate TFP growth. On the contrary, GPT-style innovations can
create fluctuations in aggregate TFP growth. To the extent that competition can lead firms
to favor embodied innovations, it could explain the decline in aggregate volatility. Comin
and Mullani (2005) present a model where the willingness to spend resources on the de-
velopment of GPT-style innovations increases with the stability of the market share of the
industry leader. As competition increases and market shares become more volatile, firms
endogenously decide to focus more on embodied innovations, and less on GPT innovations.
Finally, financial innovation could explain our facts, either directly, or indirectly through
the competition channels just described, since financial development favors entry of new
competitors. The direct link could be that financial innovation prevents credit crunches at
the same time at it encourages individual risk taking (see Thesmar and Thoenig (2004) for
instance).
5 Testing the Proposed Explanations
[...]
3This is because the standard sticky price model assumes a constant velocity, hence y = m − p and
, for given volatility of m, the only way to decrease the volatility of y is to increase the volatility of p.
Sticky price models are one example in the class of models with counter-cyclical markups. Models with real
counter-cyclical markups would not make the counter-factual prediction.
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6 Conclusion
[...]
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Table 2: Increment in sectoral correlation vs. increment in average firm level volatility at the sector level
Dependent Variable ∆ sectoral correlation of ∆ sectoral correlation of ∆ sectoral correlation of ∆ sectoral correlation of 
growth in value added growth in employment growth in productivity growth in TFP
Increment in average -0.08 -0.35 -0.45 -0.4
 firm-level volatility (0.098) (.1) (.1) (.075)
Constant -0.076 -0.044 0.01 -0.028
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (.007)
N 665 661 661 661
R2 0% 1.76% 3.13% 4.18%
standard errors in parenthesis
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